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Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: 
Towards a Framework of Analysis 
 
Richard Jackson 
 
Africa is in a deep and persistent malaise. It is by far the least developed continent 
economically, and the most conflict-prone politically. In policy-making circles and 
media characterisations, it is „the hopeless continent‟ (The Economist May 13-19, 
2000). Such pessimism is driven in part by the failure to manage — much less resolve 
— the destructive consequences of multiple violent conflicts. The ineffectiveness of 
conflict management efforts by the United Nations, the OAU, sub-regional 
organisations, or eminent personalities like Nelson Mandela or Jimmy Carter, is 
itself due in large part to the lack of a conceptual framework for analysing internal 
turmoil. Without an appropriate diagnosis of the causes of conflict, remedial action 
becomes a futile, if not dangerous exercise. 
 
This article seeks to articulate in preliminary form a framework for understanding 
and diagnosing the causes of Africa‟s multiple internal conflicts. It suggests that 
these are rooted in the everyday politics and discourses of weak states, rather than in 
outbreaks of ancient hatreds, the pathology of particular rulers, or the breakdown of 
normally peaceful domestic systems; and argues that the direction of effective 
conflict resolution lies in reconfiguring local politics and reconstructing the 
malformed African state rather than in the „saving failed states‟ approaches of recent 
years. 
 
 
The Problem of Conflict in Africa 
 
Internal conflicts — civil wars, intra-state conflicts, or „new wars‟ (Kaldor 1999) — 
have their origins in domestic rather than systemic factors and involve politically 
motivated violence primarily within the boundaries of a single state. The fighting in 
these conflicts may range in a continuum from large-scale and sustained 
conventionally-based warfare — such as the war of UNITA (União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola) against the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberação de 
Angola) in Angola — to low-intensity guerilla-style warfare — such as the LRA 
(Lord‟s Resistance Army) insurgency in Uganda. It may also entail campaigns of 
genocide or „ethnic cleansing‟, such as in Rwanda in 1994 or the ongoing „slow 
genocide‟ in Burundi. 
 
There are several processes by which internal conflicts may be transformed into 
wider international conflicts. First, they can become a threat to international peace 
and security when the fighting spills over into neighbouring states or refugee-flows 
upset regional stability. Second, external states are often directly or indirectly drawn 
into the conflict through support links to the various sides of the conflict, supplying 
weapons, training, or other materials. Third, sub-state actors — such as rebel 
movements, militias, warlords — often receive financial and political support from 
diaspora communities or ethnic kin separated by international borders. Lastly, the 
international community may decide to send in a peacekeeping force, or take such 
an active interest in the fighting that it becomes a matter of international concern. 
Rarely can internal conflicts remain sequestered from the wider international 
system, and separating their internal and external aspects is not straightforward 
when internal actors seek external sponsors and when external actors are 
constrained by the necessity of using and accommodating to local agents. 
 
The problem of violent internal conflict in Africa is acute. It has been judged to be 
“the most warring region on the planet” (Van Tongeren 1999:11; Jackson 2000a:210). 
Nearly a third of Africa‟s conflicts have started since the late 1980s and indeed Africa 
is experiencing a much greater rate of increase in the number of conflicts than other 
regions, and currently has the highest number of ongoing conflicts: half of Africa‟s 
states are in conflict, affecting 20 per cent of the continent‟s population. In mid-2001, 
serious internal conflict continued in Algeria, Western Sahara, Sudan, Chad, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, and the Comoros. Many 
other African states face instability, high levels of domestic political violence, or 
burgeoning secessionist or rebel movements such as Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, 
Kenya, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ghana, Côte d‟Ivoire, and Nigeria. 
 
The primary challenge posed by Africa‟s conflicts lies in their internally driven 
character (see Table 1). At present, the only inter-state conflict in Africa is between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. Even this relatively simple border conflict, however, has been 
transformed into a wider regional conflict involving Kenya, Somalia and Libya, and 
has taken on many of the characteristics of internal conflicts. For example, both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea are supporting opposing Somali factions in a proxy war that has 
now spread to Northern Kenya. Eritrea is also supporting Ethiopian rebels operating 
out of Somalia and Kenya. 
 
Africa‟s internal conflicts pose particular conflict management challenges, not least 
because they tend to be more intense and intractable than inter-state ones. Empirical 
studies demonstrate that they tend to be more severe and costly in terms of lives and 
refugees than most inter-state conflicts, although there are clearly some exceptions 
(Jackson 1998). For example, since 1960 a full third of Africa‟s mainly internal 
conflicts experienced more than 10 000 deaths (Jackson 2000a). In the same period 10 
major conflicts alone claimed the lives of between 3.8 and 6.8 million people (Van 
Tongeren 1999:11), and in total, an estimated eight million Africans have lost their 
lives as a direct result of war — five and a half million of whom were civilians (DFID 
2000:para.22). The severity of civil wars is also revealed in the statistics on refugees 
and displaced persons. Africa has the highest level of internal displacement and 
some of the largest refugee flows in the world. In 2000, there were 11 million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa and another three million cross-border 
refugees (DFID 2000:para.21). In many cases, these refugees became the source of 
new conflicts, such as in Sierra Leone and Zaire in 1996 (Jackson 2000a; Bercovitch 
and Jackson 1997). Conflicts that lie at the more severe end of the spectrum, as 
Africa‟s internal conflicts clearly do, have been shown to be far more difficult to 
resolve (Jackson 1998, 2000b). 
 
One of the most disturbing aspects of conflict in Africa is the increasing use of 
extreme forms of violence, particularly in the post-Cold-War period:  
 
Violence is now deliberately targeted at civilians rather than armed groups, and at 
entire groups rather than individuals. In the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, Mozambique, Northern Uganda, Sudan and Angola, violence has taken 
appalling forms. Mutilation, torture of women and children, violent rituals and the 
forcible involvement of relatives, children and spouses in killing and rape are used as 
a means of waging war primarily by militia groups and by some state proxies. In 
some instances, such violence is part of ritual that binds militia groups together. 
Extreme violence can be used as a means of humiliation or revenge. More frequently, 
it is used as a means of intimidation, as is the case with the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. Here, mutilation was brutally applied as part of a 
strategy to stop people from voting or from gathering the harvest or to spread 
control over territory by sheer terror and fear, thus avoiding the need to fight (DFID 
2000:para.24). 
 
Related to these terror tactics, there has been an alarming rise in the forcible 
recruitment of children into rebel armies. It is estimated that there are presently 
around 200 000 child soldiers in Africa, many of them forced into fighting for the 
LRA in Uganda, the RUF in Sierra Leone, the Interahamwe in Rwanda, and UNITA in 
Angola (DFID 2000:para.25). 
 
The external context of internal conflicts also impacts on their management. 
Internally based conflicts are difficult enough to resolve, but when these conflicts 
draw in surrounding states and spill across national boundaries, the task becomes all 
the more problematic. Actually, internal conflicts nearly always draw in 
neighbouring states in one manner or another (Mitchell 1992). As Ayoob (1986:14) 
puts it, “Fragile politics, by definition, are easily permeable. Therefore, internal 
issues in Third World societies ... get transformed into interstate issues quite 
readily”. Modeleski (1964:20) makes a similar point: “Every internal war creates a 
demand for foreign intervention”. 
 
Table 1: Africa’s worst conflicts, 1945—present 
 
Conflict Name Dates Estimated Fatalities Intervening Parties 
 
Congo conflict 1960—1965 110 000 UN Force, USA, 
Soviet Union, 
Belgium 
 
African territories - 
Portugal 
 
1961—1975 100 000+ South Africa, 
Rhodesia, Zambia, 
Zaire 
Eritrea—Ethiopia 1965—1993 450 000—1 
million 
Soviet Union, Italy, 
China, Libya, 
Sudan, 
Somalia 
 
Nigeria—Biafra 1967—1970 1 million+ Britain, France, 
Soviet Union 
 
Angolan conflict 1975—present 300 000— 500 000 Soviet Union, Cuba, 
South Africa, USA, 
Zaire 
Mozambique 
conflict 
1976—1992 450 000 —1 
million 
 
Soviet Union, 
Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Malawi, 
France, Britain, 
South 
Africa 
 
Ugandan Civil War 1981—present 100 000—500 000 Sudan, Britain, 
Tanzania, North 
Korea, Libya 
 
Second Sudan Civil 
War 
 
1983—present 500 000 —1.9 
million 
 
USA, Libya, China, 
Iraq, Iran, Uganda 
 
Somalia Civil War 1988— present 300 000—400 000 USA, Libya, 
Ethiopia, 
UN Force 
 
Burundi ethnic 
conflict 
 
1988—present 250 000+ Rwanda, Zaire 
 
Liberian Civil War 1989—1997 200 000+ Libya, Ivory Coast, 
Burkina Faso, 
ECOWAS Force, 
Sierra Leone 
 
Rwanda Civil War 1990—present 800 000+ France, Zaire, 
Uganda, Burundi 
 
Sierra Leone Civil 
War 
 
1991— present 100 000 + Liberia, 
mercenaries, 
Britain, ECOWAS 
Force, UN 
 
Democratic 
Republic 
of Congo Civil War 
 
1996—present 1 million + Rwanda, Burundi , 
Uganda, Angola, 
Zimbabwe 
Sources: Adapted from Copson 1994:29, 106; and original data set in Jackson 1998. 
 
All of Africa‟s worst conflicts have involved multiple interventions from external 
parties (see Table 1). In fact, Africa has the highest rate of external intervention in 
conflicts, including the Middle East, which also experiences a great deal of 
intervention (Jackson 2000a). External intervention is not a primary cause of Africa‟s 
conflicts, but more an exacerbating factor. It is directly related to the failure of the 
African state. In other words, because African political systems “are internally 
incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections of the external 
environment, they are easily manipulated from the outside” (Mujaju 1989:260). 
 
The external linkages in internal conflicts are manifested in the high level of direct 
military intervention by outside states. Military intervention into Francophone 
politics continues to be an important pillar of French policy in Africa, although there 
are signs that this is diminishing. In the post-Cold-War period, French troops have 
been most visibly involved in Rwanda (1994), Comoros (1995), and the Central 
African Republic (1998). The current levels of external intervention in Africa‟s 
conflicts are historically linked to Cold War politics. Superpower competition for 
clients from the 1960s onwards saw the Soviet Union and the USA successfully carve 
for themselves spheres of influence by virtue of the predominant roles they played 
both ideologically and militarily in Africa (Obasanjo 1996:16). Particularly in the 
Horn of Africa and southern Africa, Cold War competition had a pronounced effect. 
In each case, an exacerbation of local cleavages provided the entry point (Lyons 
1996:86). 
 
A direct effect of Cold War interventionism was the massive militarisation of many 
regions, erecting obstacles to future conflict resolution efforts. Large quantities of 
weapons were shipped to the Horn of Africa by the superpowers in what became a 
futile pursuit of influence (Lyons 1996:87). By one estimate, a total of US$8 billion in 
weapons was delivered to Ethiopia and Somalia between 1972 and 1990 alone (DFID 
2000:para.45). Since then, of course, much of this weaponry has been lost to 
insurgent groups or found its way onto the black market. By the early 1990s, the 
entire region was so awash with arms that international efforts to limit arms 
shipments to the region will continue to have minimal effect on the level of fighting 
for many years to come (Lyons 1996:87). Several African conflicts that were caused 
directly by internal disagreements, therefore, were internationalised by the Cold 
War due to the readily available supplies of weapons systems to warring factions 
(Conteh-Morgan 1993:29). 
 
 
Globalisation and Africa’s Violent Internal Conflicts 
 
In the post-Cold-War period, Africa‟s internal conflicts have mutated into new 
forms. Characterised by a blurring of the lines between war, organised crime, and 
large-scale human rights violations, these „new wars‟ (Kaldor 1999) demonstrate new 
modalities which distinguish them from earlier, more conventional „civil wars‟ 
(Henderson and Singer 2000; Keen 1998). In terms of the actors typically engaged in 
Africa‟s internal conflicts, the processes of globalisation have widened the number 
and type of participants. Along with the principal protagonists of government 
armed forces and insurgents, it is not uncommon to see a range of other internal 
groups such as ethnically based militias, specialised security services, semi-
mercenary units, armed religious cults, warlords, and criminal gangs (De Waal 
1997). External parties representing international constituencies are also drawn into 
internal conflicts, such as humanitarian agencies, peacekeepers, foreign mercenaries, 
private military companies (PMCs), and entrepreneurs and international capitalists. 
The goals of the protagonists are also more diffuse. Traditional ideological and 
political objectives, such as regime overthrow or secession, often overlap with 
chauvinistic ethno-nationalist and/or economic aims. The dual aims of UNITA in 
Angola — overthrowing the MPLA government and maintaining control over rich 
diamond-producing regions — exemplify the expanded conflict goals of actors in 
Africa‟s internal conflicts. 
Africa‟s internal conflicts in the post-Cold-War period have also demonstrated an 
expanded repertoire of strategies for pursuing conflict goals, most notably strategies 
that involve serious human rights violations. Although the use of terror by civil war 
armies has been commonplace throughout history, the atrocities witnessed in 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, to name a few, have articulated a new 
lexicon of terms to describe the horrors experienced by civilian populations — ethnic 
cleansing, mass rape, genocide, politocide, child soldiers. In February 1996, Sierra 
Leonean rebels sought to abort the first elections for more than 25 years by 
terrorising local populations. Hundreds of ordinary people had their fingers, hands, 
arms, noses, or lips chopped off with machetes before and during the election 
(Shawcross 2000:169).  
 
The outcomes of these conflicts have also increased in their range of possibilities. 
While some have resulted in regime change (Liberia) or secession (Eritrea), others 
have settled into almost permanent conditions of state collapse (Somalia), 
warlordism (Sierra Leone), or cycles of ceasefire followed by further outbreaks of 
fighting (Angola, Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo). A few have resulted 
in fragile political settlements enforced by powerful external actors (Central African 
Republic, Lesotho), while an even smaller set has reverted to conditions of semi-
state-collapse (Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 
 
The Conceptual Problem of Internal Conflict 
 
The emergence of useful frameworks for analysing contemporary internal conflict is 
hampered by two key assumptions that underpin much current diplomatic thought 
and practice in relation to the problem of international conflict. First, there is a 
tendency among policy-makers and strategic analysts to view international security 
in traditional Clausewitzean terms as a problem of inter-state war, where 
conventional forces fight pitched battles for the control of territory. Second, inter-
state war is itself generally conceived of as a breakdown in the normally peaceful 
relations between states. These (implicit) analytical lenses also tend to dominate the 
analysis of internal conflicts. Formulating the problem of conflict in these terms — as 
primarily inter-state and essentially abnormal — is proving to be problematic at both 
the diagnostic and remedial levels. 
 
In the first instance, it is an incontrovertible fact that in the post-war period the 
majority of international conflicts have been located in the developing world and 
they have been internal or intra-state in character, or have possessed a substantial 
intra-state dimension, even if by all appearances they seem to be inter-state disputes 
(Ayoob 1996:37; Kaldor 1999:29). Our brief review of internal conflict in Africa 
substantiates this assertion. More importantly, it is the conclusion of every major 
empirical study on international conflict (Small and Singer 1982; Jung and Schlichte 
1999; Byman and Van Evera 1998; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997). Regarding the 
second common assumption, the internal conflicts that have come to predominate as 
threats to international peace and security are not „breakdowns‟ in normally peaceful 
political systems, or the aberrant suspension of domestic politics. Rather, they are 
the direct result of a particular form of politics that is rooted in the structures and 
processes of „weak states‟, and which has its own political logic. In extreme forms, 
internal conflicts are the deliberate creation and maintenance of „war economies‟, 
situations which accrue significant benefits for an array of local and international 
actors (Keen 1998). In this sense, internal conflict can be viewed as a rational policy 
within a constrained political space. 
 
In the face of such unambiguous data, it is surprising that the study of international 
conflict has largely focused on the Clausewitzean type of inter-state war. Civil 
conflicts have — until fairly recently (David 1997) — received only marginal 
attention in the scholarly literature on international conflict management and 
security analysis (Scherrer 1999:52; Licklider 1993:6-7). Even within the dominant 
research tradition, however, comparative research on the causes of war has achieved 
virtually no cumulative results since systematic empirical investigations began. 
More often than not, results are „atomistic‟ and even contradictory. This is the direct 
result of researchers employing different definitions, empirical indicators, time 
periods, regions under analysis, and methodological premises, and failing to 
integrate levels of analysis and overall theoretical approaches (Gantzel 1997:138). In 
other words, there is a lack of accepted theoretical frameworks for conflict analysis 
and diagnosis. 
 
Civil war research, long confined to „area studies‟ but recently gaining acceptance in 
international relations, is beset with a similar array of problems. For example, a 
section of the current literature focuses on so-called ethnic conflicts in international 
politics (Kaufman 1996a). Typically, it is asserted that „tribally based warfare‟ erupts 
“where ethnic and other hatreds had long been officially suppressed but never 
extinguished in the hearts and minds of populations” (Snow 1996:26, 38). Quite apart 
from its ethnocentric baggage (Howard 1995/6:28-29), the ancient hatreds analysis is 
mono-causal. It risks ignoring the prosaic political and economic roots of ethnic 
conflict (Keen 1998:10-11). In addition, while identity politics may well depend on 
collective memory, it is also the case that these are often „reinvented‟ when other 
sources of political legitimacy — socialism, post-colonial forms of nationalism — fail 
or corrode (Kaldor 1999:7). 
 
Accompanying the „ethnic‟ explanation is a focus on mass-led dimensions, as if most 
internal conflicts were outbursts of spontaneous and uncontrollable social forces. 
These approaches undervalue the role of the political elite in the social life of 
particular communities, and in the interaction between the various political 
communities constituting the international system. They also fail to consider the 
logic of perceived threats, constraints, and opportunities that lead elites to make the 
choices they do in situations of ongoing political crisis (Job 1992:28). Analytically 
misguided, mass-level explanations of internal conflict have serious policy 
implications. In most cases, under-appreciating elite decisions and actions hinders 
conflict management efforts (Ayoob 1992:63; Brown 1996:584). 
 
A more serious problem lies in the portrayal of contemporary civil wars as simply a 
breakdown in a particular system, or a retreat from normally peaceful political 
forms. Emphasising the existence or re-emergence of „ancient hatreds‟ or a 
“primitive instinct for violence” (Kaplan 1994) puts a stress on irrationality, as if 
persisting civil war “is a perversion of reason that would otherwise lead men and 
women to adopt peaceable behaviour” (Bardal and Keen 1997:797-98). Both views of 
civil war — as a systemic failure and as defying rational explanation — ignore the 
considerable objective (and subjective) rationality of employing political violence in 
politically fragile, ethnically fractured, and economically weak states (Herbst 
1996/7). In such circumstances, violence can perform a variety of functions in 
alternative systems of profit, power, and protection. 
 
In a valuable contribution to the emerging literature on internal conflicts, Brown 
(1996:573) distinguishes between background and proximate causes, and identifies 
four main clusters of factors that lead to violence: 
 
structural factors such as weak states, security concerns, and ethnic geography; 
political factors such as discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national 
ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics; economic/social factors such as 
widespread economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic 
development and modernisation; and cultural/perceptual factors such as patterns of 
cultural discrimination and problematic group histories. 
 
 
Another important approach attempts to differentiate internal conflicts by type to 
see what kinds of contingent generalisations can be produced. Here, conflicts are 
categorised into types according to their sources or causes. Rupesinghe (1992:14-20), 
for example, suggests five different kinds of internal conflict: ideological conflicts, 
governance and authority conflicts, racial conflicts, environmental conflicts, and 
identity conflicts. Brown (1996), in turn, divides internal conflicts into two 
dimensions: elite-triggered or mass-triggered conflicts; and internally driven or 
externally driven conflicts. This gives four main types, of which there are a number 
of sub-types, such as ideological conflicts, ethnic conflicts, power struggles, „spill-
over‟ conflicts, and economically motivated conflicts.  
 
A promising development in some recent studies lies in a re-focusing of attention on 
state variables. Efforts to „bring the state back in‟ to the analysis of internal conflict 
have so far focused on two related processes. The first is the process of state-building 
in the developing world. It is argued that, in a general sense, conflict is the result of 
state-making — both in terms of territorial consolidation and institution-building 
(see Ayoob 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996). The process of European state-building, apart 
from taking centuries, was often bloody and violent (Tilly 1975, 1985). No less than 
the European experience, the process of creating nation-states in Africa also involves 
war-making (Herbst 1990). Furthermore, irrational colonial boundaries, chronic 
underdevelopment, external interference, and the attempt to compress the long 
process of creating a nation-state into a very short timeframe (Howard 1995/6:52) 
have made the state-building project in these regions even more prone to violent 
internal conflict than was the case in Europe. In extreme cases, the erosion of state 
autonomy can lead to states collapsing or failing altogether (Zartman 1995). During 
the European experience non-viable states were absorbed by stronger states or 
reconfigured in new forms. However, the nature of the present international system 
makes this option virtually impossible. Unfortunately, at the same time, an effective 
international response to the problem of state failure has yet to be found. 
 
A second process that explains internal conflict is globalisation. The pressures of 
globalisation on fragile states in particular, have resulted in the emergence of what is 
sometimes called „post-modern conflict‟ (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 1998). Post-modern 
conflict involves substantial economic aspects as entrepreneurs make use of 
opportunities to profit from the uncertainties created by widespread conflict (Bardal 
and Keen 1997; Keen 1998). It also involves a diverse range of actors, from local 
militias to states, multinational companies, humanitarian organisations, and 
international bodies such as the United Nations. Each of these parties generates their 
own set of interests and pressures in a complex interplay of local and external 
interactions. Within this deconstructed setting, the warring factions employ what 
some perceive as novel warfare strategies, such as ethnic cleansing, child soldiers, 
mass rape, banditry, and the use of mercenaries.  
 
What this indicates is that the historicity of internal conflict is sometimes misplaced 
in recent comparative research, either by stressing its unique post-modern character, 
or by reducing it to irrational outbursts of ethnic hatred. What is required to redress 
this theoretical gap is a “social theory, or at least a frame of reference based on 
systematic general categories, in which the historical-developmental aspect is 
reconstructed with respect to different epochs and which takes into account the 
structural dynamics which condition the emergence and behaviour of actors” 
(Gantzel 1997:139). Building on previous efforts to reintegrate the state as a key 
variable, it is argued below that internal conflicts are rooted in the nature and 
historically grounded processes of the „weak state‟. While not claiming to be a formal 
causal model, the weak-state framework is nonetheless a useful analytical tool that 
can help scholars organise the literature on internal conflict, and practitioners 
evaluate its policy implications. 
 
 
The Weak-state Framework 
 
The general argument being advanced in this study is not an altogether unfamiliar 
one, especially in the literature on the political development of post-colonial states. 
Its novelty lies in its application to international conflict research. Until recently, 
international relations scholars have been reluctant to inject political variables — 
such as state processes — into conflict research. The theoretical approach outlined 
here has its origins in recent attempts to link internal conflict in the developing 
world with the processes of state-making (Ayoob 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996; Gantzel 
1997; Herbst 1990; Howard 1995/6). The key to this approach is the premise that 
“state-making, the political variable of primary concern to political elites and 
decision-makers in Third World countries must form the centrepiece of any 
paradigm we attempt to construct for the explanation of internal and external 
behaviour of Third World states and regimes” (Ayoob 1992:64). In other words, state 
processes — state construction or adaption, ruling class formation and consolidation, 
patrimonialism and alliance creation — lie at the heart of internal conflict. 
Emphasising political factors in internal conflict is supported by recent empirical 
research (Henderson and Singer 2000), and is a necessary step in the development of 
more effective conflict resolution strategies.  
 
 
The Nature of Weak States 
 
It is possible to distinguish between strong and weak states using a matrix of social, 
political, and economic factors. Strong states involve “the willingness and ability of a 
state to maintain social control, ensure societal compliance with official laws, act 
decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage 
societal participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control 
the national economy, and retain legitimacy” (Dauvergne 1998:2). Beyond the issue 
of state capacity, however, strong states also possess high levels of socio-political 
cohesion that is directly correlated with consolidated participatory democracies, 
strong national identities, and productive and highly developed economies. Perhaps 
most importantly, strong states exist as a „hegemonic idea‟, accepted and naturalised 
in the minds of the population so that they “consider the state as natural as the 
landscape around them; they cannot imagine their lives without it” (Migdal 1998:12; 
Skinner 1978). 
 
Weak states are defined by a mirror set of opposite characteristics. They are marked, 
first of all, by unconsolidated or non-existent democracies. In addition, they face 
serious problems of legitimacy. Typically, the legitimacy crisis is expressed through 
very low political participation rates (and correspondingly high levels of 
disengagement or „exit‟ by significant sectors of the population such as peasants), a 
reliance on coercion to ensure compliance, unstable politics (for example, 
governmental crises, coups, plots, riots, rebellions), severe social cleavages (ethnic, 
religious, or class), and the centralisation of power in a ruling elite, usually focused 
on a single leader or political party. In order to secure political control in a volatile 
environment, weak-state elites are sometimes forced to construct elaborate 
patronage systems. Patrimonialism coexists with coercion in a delicate balancing act 
of keeping rivals at bay and clients happy. 
 
Second, weak states invariably lack cohesive national identities. Primary loyalties are 
often expressed in sub-national terms, and „exit‟ from the state — psychologically, 
socially, economically, and/or politically — are common. In essence, the „hegemonic 
idea‟ of statehood is missing or only weakly present: “... the modern state structure 
in Africa often forms little more than a thin carapace” (Cornwell 1999:62). This 
relates to the conditions of their emergence into juridical statehood. In the European 
experience, state-making was first and foremost an internal process in which the 
state‟s authority within a given territory emerged organically and was quickly 
followed by external sovereignty, the formal recognition of other states. In contrast, 
the colonial state was an alien intrusion forcibly imposed on an arbitrarily defined 
territorial unit. Decolonisation gave such territories formal sovereignty, or juridical 
independence, before a cohesive national identity was ready to emerge. 
 
Third, weak states are defined by varying levels of institutional incapacity and a 
frequent inability by governments to implement their policies (Byman and Van 
Evera 1998:37). At the extreme end of the scale, the institutions of state are incapable 
of even a minimal level of operability and may actually be in a terminal spiral of 
collapse. At the least, weak states possess under-resourced and underdeveloped 
institutional capacity, and face enormous difficulties in mobilising the population or 
regulating civil society. Even relatively straightforward governmental tasks such as 
tax collection or maintaining minimal levels of law and order can prove difficult. 
 
Institutional weakness, furthermore, is both cause and consequence of ongoing 
economic crisis. Weak states typically exhibit all the symptoms of economic 
underdevelopment — dualistic and poorly integrated mono-economies, heavy debt 
burdens, low or negative growth rates, high inflation and unemployment, low levels 
of investment, and massive social inequalities. Weak states are not precluded from 
periods of sustained economic growth such as were enjoyed by Botswana and 
Uganda in the 1990s, but by comparison with the developed states of Western 
Europe or North America they lag significantly behind. 
 
Finally, and in addition, weak states are characterised by an external vulnerability to 
international actors and forces, which is the direct result of their internal fragility. As 
Ayoob puts it, “fragile politics, by definition, are easily permeable. Therefore, 
internal issues in Third World societies ... get transformed into interstate issues quite 
readily” (1986:14). Mujaju makes a similar point. He argues that because the political 
systems of weak states “are internally incoherent and because aspects of their 
internal form are projections of the external environment, they are easily 
manipulated from the outside” (1989:260). External vulnerability can be observed in 
the permeability of weak-state borders to arms smuggling, refugee movements, and 
general contagion effects that are manifest in areas like West or Central Africa. 
Historically, it is obvious in the meddling by the superpowers and great powers in 
Third World conflicts (such as France in Africa), and the political affairs of weak 
states generally. 
 
The weak state/strong state formulation is not a binary measure, but rather a 
continuum along which states can positioned. In addition, state strength or 
weakness is dynamic, and states can move along the continuum over time given 
sufficient changes to key factors: weak states can become strong, and strong states 
can weaken. A number of states presently lie somewhere between strength and 
weakness, possessing some of the characteristics of a strong state — for example, 
effective institutions and a strong economy — but lacking others, such as an 
enduring sense of national identity, or legitimacy. Botswana, for example, possesses 
some characteristics of strong states — relatively effective state institutions, a  
growing economy, participatory politics — and is clearly further along the 
continuum towards state strength than is Sierra Leone, which lacks any of these 
characteristics. 
 
The recognition that most African states are „weak‟ is borne out by recent 
conceptualisations. They are variously seen as „underdeveloped‟ (Cottingham 1974; 
Jackson and Rosberg 1982), „overdeveloped‟ (Leys 1976; Nyang‟oro 1989), „soft‟ 
(Rothchild 1987; Doornbos 1990), „swollen‟ (Diamond 1988), „fictive‟ (Sandbrook 
1985), „quasi-states‟ (Jackson 1990) or „shadow states‟ (Cruise O‟Brien 1991). Each of 
these conceptualisations expresses one or more aspects of the crises facing Africa‟s 
weak states, and encompasses both the internal and external dimensions we have 
described. It is important to recognise that the structural features of weak states have 
very deep historical roots, most often in periods of intense colonial exploitation, and 
are not passing ephemeral phenomena (Young 1994; Boone 1994; Bayart 1993; Ake 
1981). 
 
 
Weak-state Elite Strategies 
 
The politics of weak states — the actions of elites in response to internal and external 
demands and opportunities — are conditioned by the underlying structural 
characteristics we have described: institutional weakness, economic scarcity, 
problems of legitimacy, political instability, lack of national identity, failure to secure 
the hegemonic idea of the state, and external vulnerability. For the most part, weak-
state elites aim to ensure their continued political survival and maintain an 
integrated state. Furthermore, with a mixture of careful manipulation, external 
support from powerful patrons, and a measure of fortune, weak states can stay intact 
and maintain relative stability for long periods, despite internal disorder, corruption, 
and poor economic performance. However, they are always vulnerable to internal or 
external shocks, and elites are more often than not forced to adopt strategies that 
carry significant risks of precipitating civil violence. The structural characteristics of 
weak states place extraordinary pressures on decision-makers and the policy-making 
environment. In effect, they transform weak-state politics into a continual process of 
crisis management, or what Migdal calls “the politics of survival” (1988:227-29). 
Political elites have to manage both internal and external pressures, usually through 
forms of “elite accommodation” in order to sustain a meaningful semblance of 
sovereignty (Reno 1998:2). Internally, they have continually to secure hegemony and 
manage local „strongmen‟ — individuals or groups who exercise power in their own 
right (ibid.), and who pose challenges to weak-state rulers. Externally, the demands 
of great power patrons, international financial institutions (IFIs), multinational 
companies (MNCs), and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the UN 
have to be accommodated or carefully manipulated in order to maintain access to 
resources and to avoid sanctioning behaviour. Typically, a number of strategies are 
employed to these ends, and they can be seen in the table below. 
 
Table 2: The underlying and proximate causes of internal conflicts  
   
Underlying Causes 
 
The structural characteristics of weak states 
 
*Institutional weakness 
*Economic crisis 
*Legitimacy and political crisis 
*Patrimonialism 
*External vulnerability and contagion 
 
Proximate Causes 
 
The politics of weak states—elite strategies 
 
*Ethnic politics 
*Exclusive politics and political 
centralisation 
*Authoritarianism and repression 
*Patronage politics 
*Democratic politics and 
manipulation 
*Warlord politics and war economies 
 
 
Ethnic politics, or the politics of identity, are often a strategy of first choice for many 
weak-state elites. Ethnic politics in Africa have their roots in the contradictions 
inherent in the exercise of state power by colonial authorities seeking to establish 
hegemony (Boone 1994:111). Ethnic identity formation facilitated indirect rule, which 
in turn retarded emergent class consciousness. Following independence, weak-state 
elites also used the appeal to ethnicity in their own attempt to establish hegemony, 
“institutionalising the divisions which exist by making ethnic identity the basis for 
political and (to a lesser extent) economic participation, and by striving to improve 
the competitive strength of the ethnic groups of the top leaders of the ruling faction” 
(Ake 1976:9). For example, after coming to power in a coup in 1981, General Andre 
Kolingba established what has been termed an „ethnocracy‟ in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) (Havermans 1999a:222-3). Every important political, military, and 
judicial position was filled by his own or affiliated ethnic groups. Later, when Ange-
Felix Patasse came to power in 1993, he took revenge by excluding Kolingba‟s group 
(the Yakoma) in favour of his own group, the Sara-Kaba. 
 
The high premium on political power produces a zero-sum ethnic struggle for 
dominance (Diamond 1988:21), which may be expressed in violent internal struggles. 
As mentioned, ethnic competition has the advantage of being a major antidote to 
class consciousness. The politics of identity can also serve as a source of political 
legitimacy when other sources — socialism, nationalism, populism — fail or corrode 
(Kaldor 1999:7). By creating vertical links across class strata (through identity-based 
patron-client networks, political graft, resource allocation, and so on), it helps to 
maintain a level of integration quite out of proportion to objective class differences, 
which are often severe. Furthermore, the conditions in weak states are ideal for this: 
ethnic consciousness is already well developed, and ethnic mobilisation is always 
likely to be successful in societies with homogenous political constituencies and 
regions, and only a rudimentary development of secondary associations. Of course, 
the danger of the appeal to ethnicity is that it can easily spiral into all-out war or, for 
a time, out of control of the elite and into mass civil violence. In the CAR, the 
struggle between ethnic groups over access to the country‟s scarce economic 
resources led to serious conflict in 1996 that was only controlled through regional 
and UN peacekeeping operations.  
 
The patterns of exclusive politics, political centralisation, and authoritarian forms of 
governance that are so evident in Africa, and which are so often at the root of 
internal conflicts, have similarly deep historical roots. Colonial authorities in Africa 
subjected the economy to strict control in order to restrict the flow of wealth to the 
population. The consequence of this was to leave the bourgeoisie, or the elite, with a 
precarious material base and a need to establish hegemony. The absence of a 
bourgeoisie grounded in a solid and independent economic base and successfully 
engaged in the private accumulation of capital compelled them to take direct control 
of the state, thus transforming politics into a material struggle. It provided the 
opportunity to build class power through the mechanisms of the state in the context 
of increasing scarcity (Fatton Jr. 1988:254-55). In other words, class relations in weak 
states are transformed from relations of production to relations of power (Sklar 
1979:537). The violent conflict in Congo-Brazzaville that killed more than 10 000 
people in 1997 (and which continues today) was fuelled in large part by the struggle 
for control over the country‟s rich oil resources by rival factions in the country‟s elite 
(Havermans 1999b:228-9). 
 
Exclusive politics, political centralisation, and authoritarianism arise in weak states 
because the state is deprived of the relative autonomy needed to make reform 
possible, despotism unnecessary, and genuine democracy viable. These modes of 
governance mask the incapacity of the ruling elite to transform its power into 
effective, political, economic, and cultural policies (Fatton Jr. 1988:254-55). From this 
perspective exclusive politics — the one-party state, for example — is in fact, class 
action by the elite to establish and retain hegemony. Furthermore, the struggle for 
control of the state is Hobbesian and vicious and only reaches equilibrium when one 
contestant emerges the victor. In addition, centralisation and exclusion has the 
advantage of depoliticising society by reducing the effective political participation of 
the population, intimidating them with state power, and concentrating all power in 
the hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie (Ake 1976:13). As with ethnic mobilisation, 
these strategies also carry risks. Generally, “the exclusionist strategies adopted by 
many of the leaders of independent Africa and the steady concentration of power 
around a coterie ... works against any consolidation of systemic legitimacy in the 
state as structure” (Cornwell 1999:67).  
 
More specifically, the struggle for hegemony or the application of severe repression 
can spiral into armed conflict when excluded or targeted groups attempt to protect 
themselves or take control of the state. In Liberia, the brutal and erratic regime of 
Samuel Doe eventually led to his downfall. When Charles Taylor invaded from 
neighbouring Cote d‟Ivoire in December 1990 with a group of only 150 fighters, Doe 
responded by slaughtering hundreds of people in Nimba County for supposedly 
collaborating with the rebels. In response, thousands rallied to join Taylor‟s National 
Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPLF) and within a few months Taylor was threatening 
the capital Monrovia. Siad Barre‟s brutal repression of the Isaq clan in 1988 can be 
seen in the same light and, interestingly, had the same effect. 
 
In the post-Cold-War period, African elites have had to accommodate both internal 
and external demands for greater levels of political participation, multiparty 
democracy, and „good governance‟. This has most often resulted in the adoption of 
multiparty democracy, largely through the medium of competitive elections. There 
is widespread agreement that democratic consolidation has yet to take place 
following the „third wave‟ of democracy which swept through Africa in the early 
1990s. In fact, many African elites have successfully managed the transition to 
multiparty democracy and retained control of the state, usually through the subtle 
(and not so subtle) manipulation of internal opponents and external perceptions. 
There is now a growing literature which examines the linkages between multiparty 
democracy (and its manipulation), and internal conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 
1995). In any case, democratic manipulation is a high-risk strategy which can also 
unleash unforeseen levels of civil violence. 
 
Extreme competition and internecine class struggle in weak states also provide the 
ideal conditions for the emergence of „caesarism‟, whereby a leader is entrusted with 
great power and arbitrates in an absolutist form of government. These presidential 
monarchs maintain their patrimonial power through the illegal appropriation of 
state revenues and the establishment of corruption in a network of patrons and 
clients (Fatton Jr. 1988:259). Corruption, graft, patron-client networks, and 
patrimonialism in weak-state politics are not simply the result of a breakdown in 
normal politics, or the rise to power of unusually corrupt leaders. Rather, they can be 
construed as class action necessitated by the fragility of the material conditions of the 
ruling elites. 
 
Furthermore, the process reinforces itself in important ways. For example, it often 
serves to unify the dominant classes in a framework of co-operation centred on the 
state, while simultaneously preventing the political organisation of the subordinate 
classes by maintaining and accentuating their isolation, individualisation, and 
ethnicity. This process also aids in resource extraction and capital accumulation by 
the ruling elite, because control of the political apparatus guarantees control over the 
productive forces of society. It may also enable the ruling elite to develop political 
bases and control the regional and sectoral allocation of resources. The patronage 
and corruption inherent in the structure of the state, furthermore, are enhanced 
when there is the absence of effective institutions to check the abuse of power and 
ensure administrative accountability (Diamond 1987:583). Reform coups are often 
launched to combat unacceptable levels of corruption, which can in turn lead to 
internal conflict. This is an internal shock that can unleash disintegrative forces in 
the state. For example, the successive kleptocratic governments in Sierra Leone 
sowed the seeds of the state‟s demise by systematically excluding the majority of 
Sierra Leoneans economically and politically. One response to the endemic 
corruption was the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday 
Sankoh, which demanded an end to government patronage and graft. Later, the RUF 
mutated into one of the most destructive and bestial rebel armies anywhere in the 
world. 
 
 
Weak-state Politics and Internal Conflict 
 
Weak-state politics and internal conflicts are linked in two primary aspects. In the 
first and most extreme case, rulers (and their rivals) see great benefits in the creation 
and maintenance of „war economies‟ or „complex emergencies‟ (see Bardal and Keen 
1997; Reno 1995, 1998a, 1998b; Duffield 1998; Kaldor 1999; Keen 1998; Jung and 
Schlichte 1999). Far from being a breakdown in normally peaceful politics, or an 
irrational outburst of ethnic hatred, many of Africa‟s current internal conflicts are the 
direct result of deliberate, rationally calculated strategies aimed at accumulation by 
state (and non-state) elites. In the environment created by intrusive globalisation, 
with increased external demands and decreasing internal resources, conflict and 
instability may be associated with innovative and expanding forms of political 
economy (Duffield 1998). Some internal conflicts are, in fact, a new form of politics, 
what many are calling „warlord politics‟ (Reno 1998a). 
 
Globalisation processes are the key external variable in the so-called „explosion‟ of 
internal conflict in Africa since the fall of the Berlin wall. A large number of Africa‟s 
states were sustained by the patronage they attracted from Cold War protagonists 
which allowed them to buy off political rivals, suppress local strongmen through 
superior arms, or quell internal opposition in the name of anticommunism or anti-
imperialism. Mobutu‟s regime was a classic example of this process. The loss of this 
support following the decline of superpower rivalry, and subsequent international 
pressure towards economic and political liberalism undercut the ability of African 
leaders to maintain their regimes without resorting to war or reinventing 
patrimonialism in new and innovative forms. In a related process, the political space 
for African elites has been narrowed by the imposition of the political and economic 
conditionalities of the Washington consensus. That is, “by emptying the political 
arena of ideas, competition for power was reduced to its bare essentials, personality 
and local/ethnic considerations became paramount, and the remnants of the state 
were likely to fall prey to the untrammelled competition for power” (Cornwell 
1999:71). 
 
Globalisation processes have also widened the gap between the developed and 
developing regions of the world and exacerbated the economic crisis that lies at the 
heart of many weak states. Declining revenues for both patronage and coercion have 
forced weak-state leaders to adapt, often towards the direct military control of 
resources and populations. More „traditional‟ internal conflicts, or civil wars, which 
have been ongoing since the cold war period — Sudan, Somalia, Angola — are now 
showing similar adaptions, particularly towards the formation of entrenched war 
economies. 
 
At the less extreme end of the scale, internal conflict is the inadvertent result of 
nonetheless risky strategies by African elites to hold onto power — particularly in 
times of crisis — establish hegemony, or manage political demands. Pursuing 
exclusionary politics, the indiscriminate use of state coercion on civilian populations, 
unleashing ethnic chauvinism, or manipulating multiparty elections are all high-risk 
strategies that can lead directly to war. Similarly, the failure to deal appropriately 
with spill-over or contagion effects, internal or external shocks, or eroding state 
autonomy (state collapse), can also result in internal conflict. As illustrated in Table 
2, it is the structural features of weak states which are the context or underlying 
causes of internal conflicts, and the strategies of elites which are the proximate cause 
or trigger. The key variables in explaining internal conflict, therefore, are weak-state 
structures and weak-state processes. 
 
 
The Advantages of the Weak-state Framework 
 
While some analysts regard today‟s current crop of internal conflicts as an entirely 
new phenomenon, the framework outlined here explains their deeper historical 
roots. As Duffield argues:  
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, if we wish to examine conflict we must begin by 
analysing what is normal. Or at least, those long-term and embedded social 
processes that define the conditions of everyday life. The purpose and reasons for 
conflict are located in these processes. From this perspective, political violence is not 
different, apart or irrational in relation to the way we live: it is an expression of its 
inner logic (1998:67). 
 
 
In Africa particularly, the confluence of external factors brought about by the end of 
the Cold War and the intensification of globalisation processes has altered the form 
but not the substance of internal conflicts. The conflict in Angola, for example, 
continues to be a struggle for control of the state by rival elites, even though the war 
itself has mutated into a new form of political economy centred on the illegal 
diamond and arms trades. The framework therefore helps us to understand the 
rapidly increasing linkages between domestic and international politics, and the 
ways in which globalisation processes impinge on the decision-making space of local 
political elites. In this sense, the weak-state framework acts as a bridge between 
previously separate domains of research; that is, it conceptualises the increasing 
overlap between international relations and area studies, or comparative politics. At 
the same time, it sheds new light on the effects of globalisation. It suggests that the 
peripheral regions of the world — such as Africa — far from remaining untouched 
by these forces, are powerfully affected, but not necessarily towards positive change. 
 
The framework outlined here offers a number of important advantages for conflict 
research. Heuristically, it incorporates many of the important factors identified in the 
literature in a parsimonious framework, going beyond superficial typologies or 
mono-causal models (ethnic hatred, for example) to illuminate underlying political 
processes. It directs our attention to the key political processes and background 
factors that lie at the heart of Africa‟s violent internal conflicts, such as economic 
crisis, identity politics, authoritarian and exclusionary political  structures, power 
struggles, and legitimacy crises, which are often interconnected in important ways 
(Byman and Van Evera 1998:44). By focusing on weak-state structures and processes, 
the framework links and systematises these interconnections in a coherent and 
systematic approach. The framework also puts war back into the state from whence 
it first came (see Tilley 1985). It highlights the intimate relationship between states 
and state-building, and the pursuit of hegemony — political, economic, and social — 
by violent means. 
 
 
Managing Weak-state Conflict 
 
The preceding analysis implies that current approaches to international conflict 
resolution — which are inherently state-centric in character — need to be carefully 
re-evaluated. First, identifying weak states as the key variable in Africa‟s internal 
conflicts suggests that there are likely to be many more internal conflicts in the new 
century. It also suggests that the conflicts currently under way in Africa are going to 
be difficult to resolve and will require considerable resources for state and social 
reconstruction. The task is not made easier by the processes of globalisation, which 
are contributing to the pressures and underlying conditions that propel Africa‟s 
weak states towards internal conflict. The consequences for conflict resolution 
practitioners and scholars is that early warning and preventive diplomacy must 
assume a greater priority. Numerous African states exist on the verge of internal 
conflict, and they must be monitored and assisted before large scale violence erupts 
or war economies become entrenched. When a state has been identified as being at 
risk, there are numerous preventive measures which can be applied: diplomacy and 
mediation, fact-finding missions, arms embargoes, the creation of demilitarised 
zones, disarmament and decommissioning of weapons, the preventive deployment 
of military or civilian peacekeepers, and programmes to deal with economic and 
humanitarian crises, to name a few.  
 
Second, while many current approaches to international conflict management — 
forms of peacekeeping, diplomatic bargaining, power mediation, UN task-sharing — 
are oriented towards state maintenance and the international (and national) status 
quo, the weak-state framework suggests that multi-track diplomacy (Diamond and 
McDonald 1996) and state reconstruction approaches will probably be more 
appropriate and effective. Unless the ultimate underlying cause of internal conflict 
— the weak state — is reconfigured and reformed (transformed into a strong state, 
for example) conflict resolution or even the more limited goal of conflict 
management is unlikely to be successful in the medium to long-term, and internal 
conflicts are likely to re-erupt. In fact, the framework reveals how international 
humanitarian intervention, if it is not carefully conceived and implemented, may 
actually harm the prospects for peace by aiding warlord political structures, 
legitimising illegitimate leaders, and preventing bottom-up or civil society-led state 
reconstruction (Kaldor 1999; Patman 2000). As Bardal and Keen have noted, 
“without a better understanding of the interaction between the political and 
economic agendas of parties, the conflict-mitigating efforts of outside actors may 
have the opposite effect of what is intended” (1997:807). Certainly, the resolution of 
internal conflict is unlikely to be achieved through traditional diplomatic approaches 
alone, as necessary as these may be in the initial stages of securing an end to the 
physical violence. The question, therefore, is how to transform a weak state into a 
strong state so that intense and important conflicts — which are inevitable in 
political and social life — are dealt with non-violently and positively. 
 
As the framework implies, one of the key problems of weak-state politics (which can 
often lead to internal conflict) lies in the concentration of power and its 
accompanying tendencies towards authoritarian and exclusionary forms of political 
discourse. Strategies for dealing with this condition might include establishing 
appropriate forms of participatory politics, power-sharing arrangements, 
strengthening civil society as a counterweight to state power, and constitutional 
checks and balances in the use of power. Quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisations (Quangos), such as commissions, tribunals, and trusts, for the 
promotion of human rights, protecting the rights of minorities or vulnerable groups 
in society, land claims, grievance settlement, and reconciliation and justice, are 
relatively rare in weak states. Such bodies would provide an important set of 
safeguards and pressure valves. They would also act as norm-creators, infusing 
everyday politics with respect for human rights, the rule of law, and notions of 
justice. 
 
Related to this, weak states possess weak institutions. Capacity-building must 
assume a greater priority in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, 
especially in important areas such as law-making, law enforcement, and the 
judiciary. Individual security is the sine qua non of national security in the weak state 
context. Specifically, conflict resolution efforts should include activities such as 
human rights training, good governance programmes, election monitoring, police 
training, civic education programmes, and judicial training.  
 
Perhaps the most serious problem for Africa‟s weak states is underdevelopment and 
ongoing economic crisis. These can lead directly to political instability. At the very 
least, they create the conditions whereby politics is transformed into a vicious 
competition for scarce resources. A vast range of activities can be adopted as part of 
an overall conflict resolution programme in this regard: debt cancellation or 
rescheduling, aid programmes, sustainable development programmes, local 
capacity-building activities, fairer trade terms and so on. Economic development is 
also vital for combating the chronic corruption that taints every weak state. The 
important point is that all of these activities are normally considered peripheral to 
conflict resolution, and only attempted in isolated instances. They must now assume 
a more central role and be applied alongside high-level diplomatic efforts to secure 
cease-fires or enforce political settlements.  
 
Dealing with the effects of identity politics involves conflict resolution activities 
aimed at reconciliation and justice, grievance settlement, power-sharing, guarantees 
for minority rights, confidence building measures, and targeted development 
programmes. These are just some of the elements necessary for a conflict resolution 
approach aimed at transforming the underlying logic of weak-state politics and the 
conditions which lead to internal conflict. We might also add that weak states 
possess external sovereignty as well, and efforts need to be made to strengthen 
regional organisations and their functional capacity for conflict resolution, regional 
security, arms control, co-ordinated trade, economic harmonisation, norm creation 
and maintenance, human rights, and democratisation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The violent conflicts which litter Africa‟s political landscape pose twin problems. At 
a practical level, there is tremendous pressure on diplomats and institutions such as 
the Organisation of African Unity to find durable solutions and ease the human 
suffering inflicted by seemingly intractable civil wars. At a theoretical level, there is 
little agreement on the nature and causes of these „new wars‟. In fact, the two 
problems are inextricably linked. While solving the theoretical puzzle of internal 
conflicts does not automatically furnish the political will for achieving lasting pacific 
outcomes, the lack of intellectual solutions certainly precludes it. Without an 
effective diagnosis, a cure will remain elusive. 
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